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By letter of 18 October 1990 the Committee on External Economic Relations 
requested authorization to draw up a report on trade and economic relations 
between the European Community and Japan. 
At the sitting of 18 February 1991 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that the committee had been authorized to report on this subject and 
that the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security had been requested to deliver 
an opinion. 
At its meeting of 16 July 1990 the Committee on External Economic Relations had 
appointed Mr Moorhouse rapporteur. 
The Committee on External Economic Relations decided to include in its report 
the following motions for resolutions which had been referred to it: 
motion by Mr Robles Piquer on the creation of a framework for economic 
cooperation between Japan and the European Community (B3-2284/90) 
motion by Mrs Muscardini on steel imports from Japan (B3-0146/91) 
(opinion: Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy) 
motion by Mr Robles Piquer and others on vulnerability to Japan in the 
electronics field (B3-0202/91) 
motion by Mrs Muscardini on the negotiations between the European Community 
and Japan to liberalize trade in leather and leather goods (83-0257/91) 
(opinion: Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy) 
motion by Mrs Muscardini on the EEC-Japan agreement on tanned hides 
(83-1919/91) 
motion by Mrs Muscardini on the EEC-Japan negotiations on tanned hides 
(83-0065/92) 
(opinion: Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy, 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection) 
The committee held, at its meeting of 16/17 September 1991, a public hearing. 
At its meetings of 28 January 1991, 19 March 1991, 3 April 1991, 20 June 1991, 
17 December 1991, 23 January 1992, 30 September 1992 and 24 november 1991 the 
committee considered the draft report. 
At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: De Clercq, Chairman; Stavrou, Vice-
Chairman; Moorhouse, rapporteur; Cassidy (for Chabert pursuant to Rule 111(2)), 
Melandri (for Archimbaud) , Miranda de Lage, Ortiz Climent (for Gallenzi) , Price, 
Sonneveld (for Peijs), Verhagen (for Lemmer pursuant to Rule 111(2)). 
The Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary affairs and Industrial Policy and the Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health and Consumer Protection decided not to deliver an opinion. 
The report was tabled on 1 December 1992. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on trade and economic relations between the European Community and Japan 
The European Parliament. 
having regard to its resolution of 11 September 1986 on trade and economic 
relations between the European Community and Japan, 1 
having regard to the Commission Communication to the Council of 15 March 1988 
on relations between the European Community and Japan, 2 
having regard to the report of the Economic and Social Committee on relations 
between the United States and Japan, and between the European Community and 
Japan of 25 April 1991, 3 
having regard to its resolution of 13 June 1991 on EC-Japan relations, 
calling upon Japan to assume greater international responsibilities and 
remove ~he remaining structural barriers to the free access of its domestic 
market, 
having regard to its resolution of 13 June 1991 on the automobile industry, 
affirming its support for a transitional period during which Japanese 
manufacturers' access to the European market is to be restricted whilst 
bilateral agreements between certain EC member states and Japan in the 
automobile sector are phased out, 5 
having regard to the Joint Declaration of July 1991 between the Council and 
the Government of Japan, which defines objectives for EC-Japan cooperation 
on political and security issues and advocates closer trade and economic 
relations, 
having regard to the public hearing held by its Committee on External 
Economic Relations, on trade and economic relations between the European 
Community and Japan, in Brussels on 16-17 September 1991, 
having regard to its resolution of 13 March 1992 on the consolidation of the 
EC-Japan Centre for Industrial Co-operation, 6 
OJ No. C 2551 13 • 1 Q • 1986 • 
2 COM (88) 136. 
3 OJ No. c 159,25.4.1991. 
4 OJ No .. c 183,15.7.1991. 
5 OJ No. C 1 83 1 1 5 • 7 • 1991 • 
6 COM (91) 193. 
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having regard to the Commission Communication to the Council of 20 May 1992 
on relations between the European Community and Japan, 1 the first such 
statement by the Commission for four years, 
having regard to the formal response of the Government of Japan to the 
Commission Communication, certain aspects of which it condemned as "totally 
unacceptable" , 
having regard to the Conclusions of the Council on relations with Japan 
adopted on 15 June 1992, 
having regard to the second annual EC-Japan Summit held in London on 4 July 
1992, 
having regard to its resolution of 8 July 1992 on political relations between 
the European Community and Japan, 
having regard to Rule 121 of the Rules of Procedure, 
having regard to the following motions for a resolution tabled under Rule 63 
of the rules of procedure: 
motion by Mr Robles Piquer on the creation of a framework for economic 
cooperation between Japan and the European Community (B3-2284/90) 
motion by Mrs Muscardini on steel imports from Japan (B3-0146/91) 
motion by Mr Robles Piquer and others on vulnerability to Japan in the 
electronics field (B3-0202/91) 
motion by Mrs Muscardini on the negotiations between the European 
Community and Japan to liberalize trade in leather and leather goods 
(83-0257/91) 
motion by Mrs Muscardini on the EEC-Japan agreement on tanned hides (B3-
1919/91) 
motion by Mrs Muscardini on the EEC-Japan negotiations on tanned hides 
(83-0065/92) 
having regard to the report of the Committee on External Economic 
Relations (A3-0390/92), 
A. Seriously concerned by Japan's r1s1ng global trade surplus which, having 
stabilised in the late 1980's, increased from 43.9 billion ECU in 1990 to 
71.4 billion ECU in 1991, and is now running at the rate of 92 billion ECU 
per annum, an historically unprecedented figure, 
B. Concerned that Japan's bilateral trade surplus with the EC has increased 
from 23.5 billion ECU in 1990 to 29.7 billion ECU in 1991, a figure which 
has continued to rise substantially during 1992, 
COM (92) 219. 
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c. Noting equally that Japan had a bilateral trade surplus with the United 
States of $38.4 billion in 1991, 
D. Noting that Japan's ratio of external trade to GNP amounted to only 16%, 
approximately half the OECD average of 30% for 1991, 
E. Noting that Japan's ratio of manufactured imports to GNP remained 
stubbornly low at a mere 3.6% (1991), the lowest level by far of any major 
industrialised economy, 
F. Noting that Japan's previously successful structural adjustment process, 
of increasing dependence on internal rather than external demand to 
generate growth, has now gone into reverse, and that low growth is being 
accompanied by dramatically rising trade surpluses, 
G. Anxious that Japan's persistent tendency to generate such surpluses should 
be successfully accommodated within the open, multilateral trading system, 
and that wherever possible protectionist measures should be avoided on all 
sides, 
H. Concerned that the current Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations should be 
quickly concluded on the basis of multilateral concessions, including 
significant concessions on the part of Japan, 
I. Convinced that a more general, concerted approach by the European 
Community to trade and economic relations with Japan is required, 
J. Convinced equally that such an approach has yet to be put fully into 
place, 
1. Believes that EC-Japan trade and economic relations can only be 
strengthened and developed on the basis of the "consistent and global 
approach" recently advocated by the Commission and Council; 
2. Endorses in this context the powerful analysis underlying both the recent 
Commission Communication on EC-Japan relations and the subsequent 
Conclusions adopted by the Council; 
3. Welcomes the renewed determination of the Commission and Council, as 
expressed in these texts, to press the Japanese authorities on a wide 
range of outstanding bilateral issues, in order to help build a more 
balanced trade and economic relationship between the EC and Japan; 
4. Supports the Council's desire to broaden EC-Japan relations beyond the 
narrowly commercial to encompass a deepened political dialogue of the kind 
launched by the July 1991 Joint Declaration and subsequent bilateral 
ministerial summit meetings; 
5. Encourages the Government of Japan in its efforts to fulfil the widespread 
demands that it play a more pro-active role on the international stage in 
defending and advancing the values of liberal democracies based on the 
rule of law and the social market economy; 
6. Calls on Japan and the European Community to work more closely together 
in the administration of their respective programming of economic 
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assistance in areas affected by natural disasters, extreme economic 
adversity or political upheavals threatening world peace; 
7. Looks to Japan to meet the substantial expectations and responsibilities 
which now fall on it as an economic superpower by: 
following domestic macro-economic policies which ease the emerging scale 
of its multilateral and bilateral trade surpluses, and facilitate the 
survival of free trade, 
sustaining the shift, which has recently been reversed, towards Japanese 
growth becoming increasingly dependent on domestic rather than external 
demand, 
promoting the on-going revaluation of its currency to bring trade flows 
into better balance, 
continuing the long process of domestic liberalisation and reform in 
individual sectors, to free markets to foreign competition and so extend 
to Japanese consumers the full benefits of price competition enjoyed in 
the West, 
removing all rema1n1ng tariff and non-tariff barriers to imported goods 
and services, with particular urgency being attached to i) the real 
liberalisation of the distribution system, ii) permitting foreign take-
overs and acquisitions to occur in practice as well as theory, and iii) 
the ending of collusive and exclusive practices within business groups, 
including the keiretsu; 
8. Believes, in short, that Japan must decisively reconfirm the spirit of the 
1986-88 Maekawa structural adjustment plan, which helped stabilise trade 
surpluses, and underpin that process with macro-economic policies that 
will generate a sustained pattern of buoyant domestic demand; 
9. Shares the strong concern expressed by the Commission and Council about 
the "growing tendency of the United States and Japan to seek solutions to 
bilateral trade problems through arrangements that appear discriminatory"; 
10. Believes that if EC-Japan political relations are to be more than 
symbolic, the Japanese authorities with their strong, professed 
attachment to the GATT - must resist any temptation to bilateralise 
discussion of trade and economic relations with the US, to the EC's 
exclusion or disadvantage; 
11. Believes equally that the EC and US enjoy a number of common concerns in 
respect of Japanese trade, notably in jointly sustaining pressure for 
structural adjustment and sectoral access; 
12. Welcomes efforts to present these wider interests in various international 
fora; 
13. Looks to Japan and the United States together to intensify cooperation 
with the EC in the fields of exchange-rate management, trade policy, 
competition and anti -subsidy policy, and policies for development and 
cooperation, in order to build a strong trilateral framework in which to 
discuss and help resolve pressing global issues of common concern; 
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14. Welcomes suggestions for developing a G3 forum based on the EC-Japan-US 
triangle to promote common positions among nations which collectively 
represent some two-thirds of world GNP and world trade; 
As regards Japan's position in the multilateral trading system 
15. Considers that Japan currently enjoys an enormous positive balance of 
advantages from the multilateral trading system, the opportunities of 
which have been at the heart of its post-war growth; 
16. Believes that to sustain this system of international free trade, in its 
own interest Japan needs to play a full part in easing trade friction of 
various kinds; 
17. Requests Japan to play a more active role in making concrete concessions 
within the current GATT round on market access issues of concern to both 
the European Community and the United States; 
18. Welcomes the observation both by the Commission and the Council, in their 
recent statements, that there is a clear need for a reduction in Japan's 
unprecedently high external surpluses; 
19. Believes that the Government of Japan must act decisively to contain the 
scale of its unsustainably high trade surpluses, the rise of which can 
only promote protectionist pressures and instincts worldwide, and have a 
destabilising effect on the international economy at a time of growing 
recession; 
20. Agrees with the recent Commission Communication that "the aim should be 
the full integration of Japan into the international system, by making it 
as open to foreign trade and investment as other advanced economies"; 
21. Welcomes the reaffirmation by the Government of Japan in the 1991 Joint 
Declaration of its commitment to the "principle of equitable access in 
terms of comparable opportunities" and calls for this undertaking in 
principle to be followed by concrete action; 
As regards Japanese exports to the European Community 
22. Expresses concern at the continuing tendency of Japanese exports to the 
EC to rise over time at a significantly more rapid rate than either 
Community or Japanese GNP (48 per cent during the period 1987-91); 
23. Notes that since Japanese exports to the EC (51.8 billion ECU in 1991) are 
over twice as high as EC exports to Japan (22.1 billion ECU in 1991), it 
is necessary for the latter to increase at more than twice the rate of the 
former simply to keep the bilateral trade imbalance constant; 
24. Fears that, over time, the continuing tendency of Japanese exports to the 
EC to increase at an average of around 10-15 per cent a year (since 1980), 
matched by the failure of EC exports to Japan to rise by twice that rate 
(around 15-20 per cent per annum since 1980), means that the EC-Japan 
trade deficit is likely to continue to widen, rather than narrow, in the 
years ahead; 
25. Fears that two additional factors will compound this process: 
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(i) the move to higher yalue-added production by major Japanese 
producers, which has made Japan's exports of manufactures more dependent 
on the OECD markets of North America and Western Europe over the last 
decade, a development which continues, and 
(ii) evidence in the last five years of growing export deflection from the 
US to EC markets, as protectionist pressures mount in the US and the 
European currencies prove more attractive and reliable than the dollar for 
Japan's international trade; 
26. Notes in this context that i) the proportion of Japan's total exports 
taken by the US and EC together has grown from 38 to 48 per cent during 
the last decade, and ii) whereas the US-Japan trade deficit increased by 
only 19 per cent during the period 1987-91, the EC-Japan deficit increased 
by 65 per cent; 
27. Welcomes attempts by the Government of Japan to promote voluntary export 
guidelines on selected sectors at different times, and believes that these 
efforts should be continued and developed as necessary; considers equally, 
however, that such moves can have no lasting benefit in relieving EC-Japan 
trade friction unless they are underpinned by wider structural reforms in 
the Japanese economy; 
28. Advocates in particular the conscious broadening of Japan's trade profile 
so that it can become less dependent on exporting huge volumes in 
relatively few sectors (consumer electronics, business machinery, motor 
vehicles, machine tools), so that Japan both exports and imports more in 
the very many sectors where its trade in both directions falls far ~elow 
the OECD average; 
29. Believes that such an approach, complemented by a high domestic growth 
strategy to reduce reliance on exports, and supported by a commitment in 
Tokyo to avoid export deflection from US to EC markets, could over time 
reduce the consistent growth in Japanese exports to the EC to a rate 
allowing the bilateral trade imbalance to be stabilised and then narrowed 
in the years ahead; 
30. Looks to the Government of Japan to undertake serious policy commitments 
of this kind; 
As regards European Community exports to Japan 
31. Notes with regret that, after a substantial increase in EC exports to 
Japan in 1987-89, totalling 55 per cent over three years, exports first 
stalled (in 1990) and have now actually gone into decline; 
32. Agrees with the Commission that since "the base of [EC] exports remains 
narrow and vulnerable to cyclical fluctuations", the disappointing EC 
export performance since 1990 can largely be attributed to the high 
dependence of such exports on sustained domestic growth in Japan; 
33. Recalls with concern that around half the growth in EC exports during the 
years 1987-89 was in a limited range of luxury or niche sectors, where a 
distinct social cachet often attaches to purchasing foreign products -
notably motor vehicles, alcoholic beverages and high-quality textiles; 
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34. Believes that central to improved, recession-resistant EC export success 
in Japan is greater penetration of sectors other than the luxury goods 
market; 
35. Endorses the Commission's view that "the bias of the Community's visible 
exports to luxury goods" is a consequence of a combination of two factors: 
(i) specific sectoral barriers in fields where, in other external markets, 
EC exports are extremely competitive and where Japanese producers are not; 
(ii) broader structural obstacles, which the Commission believes "are 
currently the main barriers to doing business in Japan" and which reflect 
"the failure of competition and market mechanisms in many spheres"; 
36. Supports the Commission's on-going attempts to prise open sectors where 
a variety of formal, discriminatory, government-sanctioned mechanisms are 
still being used to minimise imports of foreign goods; 
37. Notes that these techniques include: tariffs and taxes (on leather 
products, metals, foods, alcohols, motor vehicles); standards and 
certification procedures (household appliances, motor vehicles, 
pharmaceuticals, medical equipment) ; labelling requirements (food and 
other packaging) ; phytosanitary and sanitary controls (fruits, vegetables, 
flowers, meats, dairy products); and, once products have entered Japan, 
weak protection of intellectual property rights (in a wide range of 
sectors requiring patents, design registration, trademarks, service marks 
or copyrights); 
38. Welcomes Commission initiatives to force further liberalisation in the 
Japanese service sector, where highly competitive foreign producers are 
disadvantaged by discriminatory regulations of various kinds (most notably 
in legal services, insurance and certain financial markets); 
39. Supports the Commission in its belief that if adequate progress is not 
made in removing these sectoral barriers in the current GATT round, then 
"the Community should resume direct negotiations [with the Japanese], in 
the spirit of the Joint Declaration", and agrees that problems and 
progress should be kept under permanent review jointly by the Commission, 
the member states and the industries concerned; 
40. Welcomes the fact that the Council firmly endorsed this Commission 
strategy of reopening direct sectoral negotiations with the Government of 
Japan, and believes that where appropriate joint pressure should be 
exercised by the EC and US in pursuit of common claims for improved 
sectoral access of this kind; 
41. Reiterates the strong need to match action on these sectoral fronts by 
sustained pressure in the field of structural reform, to secure most 
notably the liberalisation of distribution systems and the decisive 
strengthening of competition policy, to i) allow foreign mergers and 
acquisitions, ii) outlaw collusive business practices of various kinds, 
for example among the keiretsu, and iii) open up public purchasing to 
foreign producers on a significant scale; 
42. Welcomes the Commission's declared intention, with Council support, of 
studying areas where the enforcement of Japanese anti-trust law is 
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currently inadequate and where sectors are exempt from the operation of 
anti-monopoly legislation, to the detriment of foreign competitors and 
domestic consumers alike; 
43. Supports the Commission in its continuing commitment, with Council 
support, to "identify obstacles to the freer distribution of EC goods" 
within Japan; 
44. Notes with interest the potentially fruitful outcome of the July 1992 
joint review of the US-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative (of 1989-
90), both on competition policy and on distribution systems; 
45. Hopes that the Council will be prepared to back any Commission findings on 
competition policy and distribution systems, as well as any failure of 
bilateral negotiations on sectoral access, with a political commitment to 
take considered action within the GATT against such Japanese practices as 
are found to be unfair, discriminatory or protectionist in effect; 
46. Invites the Commission to present new proposals to develop and extend its 
imaginative export promotion ("EXPROM") activities within Japan, acting 
wherever possible in concert with the national programmes of EC member 
states to the same end; 
47. Considers that encouragement should be given to the establishment of a 
European Trade Centre as a base from which European business can improve 
penetration on the Japanese market; 
As regards Japanese investment in the European Community and European investment 
in Japan 
48. Welcomes the continuing flow of Japanese direct investment into the EC, 
which stood at an accumulated total of some 48.5 billion ECU in 1991; 
Regrets the continuing sluggish level of EC investment in Japan, which by 
1991 had reached some 6.5 billion ECU; 
49. Notes, however, that the ratio of Japanese direct investment in the EC to 
EC direct investment in Japan stood at 8:1 in 1991, compared with ratios 
of·13:1 for Japan-US investment flows, and 10:1 for Japanese investments 
flows worldwide; 
50. Cautions against any assumption that Japanese direct investment flows into 
the EC will necessarily be sustained at recent high levels over coming 
years: the levelling off and decline in such flows in 1990-91 may 
accelerate still further as a result of the continuing collapse of share 
prices on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the consequent weakening of bank 
profitability and corporate access to cheap finance; 
51. Endorses the Commission's view that Japanese direct investment in the EC 
can make a useful contribution to industrial development and renewal, 
provided that it is sufficiently integrated into the economic fabric of 
the Community and leads to i) the net creation of new jobs, ii) the prog-
ressive "Europeanisation" of management, and iii) not merely the selective 
transfer of items of research and development to Europe, but ultimately 
also the establishment of autonomous, innovatory R&D centres in Europe, 
directed not only to regional but also world markets; 
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52. Believes that, as the Council concluded, "the member states should follow 
a common line towards the issue" of inward investment, and for this 
purpose strongly recommends that member states develop common EC-wide 
criteria for the evaluation of inward investment projects and minimise the 
competitive granting of subsidies, strengthening competition policy to 
this end; 
53. Accepts that EC companies should, as the Commission recommends, develop 
industrial cooperation arrangements with Japanese competitors, including 
the conclusion of strategic alliances on the development and production 
of new products; counsels, however, against any such arrangements which 
might involve the one-way transfer of technology and skills from the EC 
to Japan, as part of a conscious Japanese strategy to disarm competitors; 
54. Supports the view that the Government of Japan's proposal for an EC-Japan 
forum to promote cooperation in science and technology should be evaluated 
with these factors in mind; 
55. Reiterates that the most positive action Japan can take to promote EC 
direct investment, and the industrial cooperation which will follow, is 
to remove structural impediments of all kinds, by adopting most notably 
the reforms detailed in paragraphs 6 and 40 above; 
As regards Japanese domestic macro-economic policy 
56. Calls on Japan to resume, as a matter of priority, the shift from growth 
led by external demand to growth generated primarily by domestic demand, 
continuing the strategy identified in the 1986 Maekawa report and 
successfully pursued during the three-year adjustment plan which followed; 
57. Believes that such a strategy depends both on continuing supply-side 
liberalisation and on a deliberate policy of easing monetary and fiscal 
conditions in Japan to sustain domestic growth at a time of worldwide 
recession; 
58. Welcomes successive reductions during 1992 of the official discount rate 
in Japan ; notes the announcement of 28 August 1992 by the Government of 
Japan regarding a draft supplementary budget totalling some 67.4 billion 
ECU for the current fiscal year, views this as a useful step in the right 
direction; 
59. Endorses the call of both the Commission and Council that Japan should 
pursue policies designed to allow the Yen to resume its long-run rise 
against European currencies; 
60. Believes that the continued undervaluation of the Yen, partly as a result 
of non-liberalisation of certain financial markets, seriously exacerbates 
Japan's trade and economic relations with its trading partners; 
61. Considers that sustained investment in Japan's domestic infrastructure, 
with a downgrading of agriculture and the freeing up of land needed for 
improved housing, would facilitate structural adjustments and the creation 
of an economy in better balance with the rest of the world; 
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62. Urges Japan, in its own and trading partners long term interests, to 
pursue policies leading to a more internationally-integrated, domestic 
growth-led economy; 
In Conclusion 
63. Welcomes the recent commitment of the Commission and Council to develop 
a "consistent and global approach" to EC trade and economic relations with 
Japan, in the context of an unprecedented high and rising bilateral trade 
imbalance; 
64. Believes that such an approach, which is both urgently necessary and long 
overdue, can best be advanced by pursuit of the systematic policy agenda 
outlined in this resolution; 
65. Believes that the concerted exercise of political will by the Council in 
sustaining and supporting Commission efforts to open Japanese markets and 
secure a better balance in EC-Japan trade relations is the vital 
precondition for making a success of the new "consistent and global 
approach" towards Japan; 
66. Sees the new annual EC-Japan Summit dialogue structure introduced by the 
1991 Joint Declaration as the ideal vehicle for focussing EC political 
will regularly on outstanding bilateral issues; 
67. Invites the Commission to draft an annual report on the state of trade and 
economic relations between the European Community and Japan, to be 
published three months in advance of the Summer Summit of the Japanese 
Prime Minister, President-in-Office of the European Council and President 
of the European Commisssion; 
68. Considers that this annual report should be formally communicated to the 
European Parliament as well as to the Council in sufficient time to give 
Parliament the opportunity to draft an annual motion on this subject; 
69. Invites the President-in-Office of the Council (Foreign Affairs) to 
formally report to the Parliament's Committee on External Economic 
Relations on the outcome of the annual EC-Japan Summit; 
70. Draws attention to the list of specific sectoral issues in EC-Japan trade 
relations which follows; 
SECTORAL ISSUES IN EC-JAPAN TRADE RELATIONS 
As regards the European automobile industry: 
71. Notes that Japan's automobile production accounts for 30% of the world 
total of this product; 
72. Notes that Japan exported between 1.1 and 1.3 million cars to the European 
Community annually in the years 1989-91 (in addition to vehicles 
manufactured by Japanese producers within the Community); 
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73. Notes that Japan imported only 200,000 cars annually from the European 
Community during the years 1989-91; 
74. Notes that the visit of the United States President to Tokyo in January 
1992, for the purpose of promoting US-Japanese trade relations, resulted 
in Japanese car firms voluntarily seeking to double their car parts 
imports within two years and to open up their dealerships to 20,000 US 
cars a year; 
75. Affirms its support for the so-called "Elements of Consensus" reached 
between the European Commission and the Government of Japan on trade in 
automobiles for the years 1993-99; insists on the Commission strictly 
adhering to its written interpretation of this agreement; 
76. Welcomes as an interim measure the most recent EC-Japan automobile talks 
(of 23 April 1992), aiming toward cutting direct Japanese car exports to 
the European Community by around 5%; 
77. Welcomes the Commission's intention of ensuring that market penetration 
by Japanese automobile manufacturers is limited until the end of the 
transitional period in 1999; urges the Commission to follow the precedent 
set by the United States by ensuring that European replacement parts 
manufacturers become the main suppliers in this area and to negotiate a 
joint initiative with the Government of Japan with regard to vehicle and 
spare parts imports; 
78. Strongly recommends that European manufacturers embark on a genuine 
process of internal restructuring based on renewing their research and 
training systems and improving their mutual contacts; 
As regards electronics and semiconductors: 
79. Welcomes the Council resolution of 18 November 1991 on electronics and 
information technology, noting the need to speed up the process of 
standardisation and certification in order to strengthen competition 
within these sectors; 
80. Notes that Japanese companies control 28% of the world electronics 
market, compared to a US share of 44% and an EC share of 19%; Notes with 
concern that Japanese corporations hold 60% of the world market in 
consumer electronics, in particular; 
81. Considers the electronics industry to be an example of a strategic or 
"pervasive" sector, penetrating other sectors and areas of activity, 
indispensable for example to the automotive industry, medical sector and 
automation generally; 
82. Notes with concern the Japanese electronics industry's 51 billion ECU 
world trade surplus in 1991 , which is forecast to increase to 70. 3 
billion ECU by 1995, thereby increasing the EC-Japan trade deficit from 
29.7 billion ECU in 1991 to around 40 billion ECU in 1999, ceteris 
paribus; 
83. Notes that since 1975, the European Community's employment in consumer 
electronics has fallen by more than 50%, despite major market growth in 
electronics over that period; 
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84. Notes the clear connection between the r1s1ng level of Japanese exports 
in electronics to the European Community since 1975, involving established 
examples of dumping, and the decline in EC employment in the electronics 
industry; 
85. Welcomes the Parliament's commissioning of a special review of anti-
dumping measures, which are particularly prevalent in the electronics 
sector; 
86. Notes that further urgent action is required to prevent all forms of 
dumping, frequently circumvented by "screwdriver" assembly operations; 
87. Notes that the Japanese domestic electronics distribution system, 
wholesale and retail, is controlled by a cartel of organisations operating 
anti-competitive practices, thus placing significant structural 
impediments in the way of European exporters to Japan; 
88. Regrets that the Government of Japan has failed to develop appropriate 
distribution regulations applicable equally to all electronics goods, 
whether imported or produced locally, and to provide appropriate remedies 
to those seeking to export to Japan who are facing anti-competitive 
practices by Japanese distributors; 
89. Welcomes the current investigation by the Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
under the Anti-Monopoly Law into allegations that the four major Japanese 
consumer electronics manufacturers are illegally controlling the retail 
prices of their products, as demonstrated by their identical pricing of 
electronics goods on the domestic market; 
90. Believes that a further expansion of the Joint Commission and EACEM "Parts 
and Components" Scheme might help to redress some of the imbalance in 
electronics trade between the EC and Japan; 
As regards alcohol and spirits: 
91. Recalls the Parliament's resolution of 11 September 1986, calling for the 
removal of tariffs and discriminatory taxes in relation to alcoholic 
beverages and for a simplified and aligned set of standards and 
certification procedures in this sector; 1 
92. Welcomes the 1987 GATT Council Ruling concerning Japan's Liquor Tax; 
93. Welcomes the Japanese changes to the Liquor Tax of 1 April 1989, which 
equalised the rates of taxation on imported and locally-produced whiskies, 
but notes that tax differentials continue to apply within the spirits 
sector; 
94. Believes that Japan should address forthwith all outstanding trade issues 
in this sector, including its failure to fulfil! its GATT obligations by 
reducing the Liquor Tax differentials within the spirits sector to "de 
minimis" levels and abandoning its significantly higher import tariffs 
OJ No. C 255,13.10.1986 (pp. 149-157). 
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than those applied similarly to Japanese products entering into the 
European Community; 
95. Stresses the need to control discriminatory pricing policies and maintain 
equitable market prices in the liquor and alcoholic beverages market in 
Japan; 
96. Considers that, in the interests of Community producers and Japanese 
consumers, the Government of Japan should introduce strict measures to 
prevent the counterfeiting of alcoholic products and beverages; 
97. Notes that there still remain high tariffs on brandy, whisky and bottled 
wine; 
As regards the construction industry: 
98. Notes that Japan is the second largest contracting nation in the world 
after the us, enjoying 15.5% of the world's total construction business; 
99. Notes that Japanese contractors have 2.2% (1991) of the market share in 
Europe, whereas the European Community presence in the construction field 
in Japan is virtually nil; 
100. Believes the Japanese private-sector construction market to be, to all 
intents and purposes, wholly closed to European contractors; 
101. Expresses serious concern about structural impediments facing foreign 
contractors in Japan as a result of complicated and onerous registration 
and land acquisition procedures, unjustifiably restrictive bid 
solicitation (which is inconsistent with GATT principles), reinforced by 
the anti-competitive Japanese tendering system; 
102. Regards with dismay the reluctance of the Government of Japan to stimulate 
anything more than token participation by foreign contractors in the 
Japanese market even when construction resources are under pressure of 
demand; 
103. Regrets the reported lack of European Commission assistance to EC 
construction companies in attempting to obtain contracts within Japan; 
As regards the chemical and pharmaceutical industries: 
104. Acknowledges that the European chemical and pharmaceutical industries, in 
spite of difficulties encountered, have a notable record of success in 
trading with Japan; 
1 05. Notes that exports and investments by the EC chemical industry are 
hindered by Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law and distribution structures, which 
together obstruct trade; 
106. Expresses serious concern about the predatory nature of competition in 
Japan's chemical industry, facilitated by arbitrary and discriminatory 
safety standards; 
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107. Notes the reportedly inadequate assistance given by the European 
Commission to the European chemical industry in securing direct investment 
opportunities and reciprocal competitive conditions; 
As regards the leather industrv: 
108. Notes with concern that Japan continues to impose a 60% tariff on most 
imported leather, except for a quota dutied at 20% representing less than 
one day's production of the European leather industry. This prohibitive 
tariff quota system also applies to footwear; 
109. Emphasises that Japan has no significant domestic resource of hides and 
skins; 
110. Notes that the European Community, by contrast, provides unlimited access 
to leather imports at a mere 3-7% tariff and duty-free ceilings under the 
Generalised System of Preferences; 
111. Notes that the European Community's leather industry is highly competitive 
both as to price and quality, as evidenced by its succes~ on other 
international markets; 
112. Supports the European leather industry's demand for an immediate reduction 
of 50% of the 60% tariff currently applied to leather imports into Japan, 
with a formal commitment to full reciprocity in the leather trade and the 
abandonment of the tariff-quota system by the end of 1996; 
As regards agricultural products & foodstuffs generally: 
113. Deplores the anti-competitive ban on all rice imports into Japan; 
considers this restriction to be grossly unjustified and insists that it 
be immediately lifted; 
114. Deplores the import ban on EC citrus fruits, apples, pears and vegetables; 
115. Welcomes the abolition of the commodity tax on fruit juices; 
116. Notes that the Commission in its recent Communication on EC-Japan 
relations rightly expresses serious concern about the Government of 
Japan's imposition of high tariffs on cheese, processed pork, beef, sugar, 
confectionery, corn and potato starch; 
117. Regrets likewise the quantitative restrictions imposed on milk, cream, 
skimmed milk powder, butter, and certain fish products; 
118. Believes that Japanese phytosanitary, sanitary and labelling measures to 
be overprotective and extreme, with the effect of unnecessarily impeding 
EC exports to Japan in the agricultural and food sectors. 
*** 
119. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, 
Commission, the Governments and,the Parliaments of Member States, and the 
Government and Diet of Japan. 
- 17 - PE 155.246/fin. 
B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I) THE RE-mmRGENCE OF RISING JAPANESE TRADE SURPLUSES 
After four years of consistently contracting trade surpluses, Japan has begun 
in 1991 to post widening surpluses on an accelerating scale. The "trade surplus 
problem", which so bedevilled Japanese relations with the United States and the 
European Community in the mid 1980's, is reasserting itself very rapidly and on 
a substantial scale. 
The Japanese current account and trade surpluses rose progressively through the 
early to mid-1980's to reach a peak of $ 86 billion and $ 93 billion 
respectively in 1986 (and$ 94 b. and$ 101 b. respectively in fiscal year 1986-
87). After that, they gradually declined to$ 36 b. and$ 64 b. respectively in 
1990. The current account surplus fell from 4. 5% of Japan's gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 1986 to 0.7% in 1990. During the same period, the value of 
Japan's exports in dollar terms rose by 12%; the value of its imports by 71%. 
Japan has traditionally enjoyed an exceptionally low ratio of manufactured 
imports to total imports and of manufactured imports to GDP. During the period 
1986-90, Japan's performance on the first measure rose from 40% to 50% (the 
comparable figure in the US is 80%, and in Germany 76%). On the second measure, 
it improved from 2.4% to 3.4%, still considerably lower than any other major 
industrialised nation (the figure in the US is 6%, and in Germany 14%). 
During the period 1986-90, the EC-Japan trade imbalance stabilised at a deficit 
figure of around $ 20 b. per annum. During the earlier part of the 1980's, the 
deficit had averaged some $ 12-14 b. per annum. At that time, Japan's surpluses 
with the EC and the US were oroadly comparable in size. Indeed in 1980, the 
Japan/EC surplus was larger. As the 1980's progressed, however, the Japanese 
surplus with the US accelerated rapidly, rising from$ 10 b. in 1980 to a peak 
of$ 53 b. in 1987. From then on, the US figure declined gradually, to$ 38 b. 
in 1990. The trade performances of the US and the EC thus slowly converged 
towards a pattern familiar in the earlier 1980's. 
Progress in easing Japan's global and bilateral trade and current account 
surpluses during the period 1986-90 may be attributed to several factors. These 
include, most notably, strong international pressure, especially from the United 
States, leading the Japanese government to attempt to reorient its economic 
growth pattern away from external demand towards domestic demand. The 1986 
Maekawa Report, underpinned by the political leadership of the then Prime 
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, represented the high point of a real commitment in 
Tokyo to "structural reform" of the Japanese economy. Important progress in this 
direction was underpinned by a serious attempt to ease Japan's remaining formal 
barriers to imports, especially from the EC and the US - reflected in a series 
of "market opening packages"- and a sustained period of domestic growth 
averaging 6% per annum. 
The departure of Mr Nakasone in 1987 ushered in a period of political drift 
during which progress on the trade front was sustained by autonomous factors -
most notably high domestic demand, and with it, growing consumer interest in 
foreign products. As growth however slowed in 1990-91, falling from 6% to 3%, 
the demand for imports slackened. During these same years, the substantial rise 
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in the value of the yen, which depressed export growth and increased demand for 
imports, also stalled. 
Whereas the yen rose substantially in the period 1985-87, its value after 1987 
remained broadly constant against most other currencies. The time-lagged effect 
of this change, compounded by lower growth in Japan, was to reduce the on-going 
appeal of. imports and increase the incentive to rely on exports as the motor for 
retaining growth. 
The effects of this new situation have now become apparent. Since the beginning 
of 1991, Japan's global trade surplus has risen again, for the first time in 
four years. The pace of this increase has been spectacular. In January 1991, the 
trade surplus had dipped as low as$ 1 b. for the month. By October 1991, the 
figure had jumped to $ 10 b. for the month. As a result of this sudden shift, 
the Japanese trade surplus for the first half of the 1991-92 fiscal year (ie 
April-September 1991) totalled almost$ 40 b., a figure higher than that for the 
whole of the previous year. 
The Japanese Government has revised its projections for the whole year's current 
account surplus to some$ 60 b., and the trade surplus to some$ 80 b. However, 
the OECD is predicting higher respective figures of $ 68 b. and $ 97 b. for 
1991, and$ 77 b. and$ 109 b. for 1992 (assuming only 2.5% GDP growth). 
As the Japanese trade surplus problem has rebounded in 1991, the bilateral 
Japan-US component of the surplus has continued to shrink, whilst the EC and 
ASEAN/Asian NICs components have grown. In some months of 1991, for the first 
time since 1980, the EC surplus was actually larger than the US one. The total 
Japan-EC trade surplus is expected to rise to between $ 25 b. and $ 30 b. this 
year, compared with $ 18.5 b. last year. EC exports to Japan are down 10-15%, 
with Japanese exports to the EC rising by about the same amount, in yen terms. 
In dollar terms, the figures are higher. 
As a result of Japan's rising surplus, manufactured imports as a percentage of 
GDP look set to fall for the first time in four years. The external component 
in total demand will correspondingly rise- to at least 1.7% of GDP (over half 
the national rate of growth), compared with 0.7% last year. Progress in the 
direction of the Maekawa reforms has thus not only stalled; it has actually 
reversed. 
The new Japanese Prime Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, stated before election to the 
Presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) that Japan's trade surplus 
problem might well have become "insoluble". He admitted that, despite various 
policies to counteract it, any dip in economic growth seemed to lead to the 
surplus's dramatic, and politically embarrassing, reassertion. Given that, at 
its low, the surplus never fell below $ 36 b. (current account) and $ 64 b. 
(trade account) - the baseline established by high growth - Mr Miyazawa' s 
observation seems both insightful and worrying. 
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II) THE DISTI{I:!C'l'IVE FEATURES OF JAPANESE TRADE 
PERFORfi.ANCE 
Does Japan's persistent tendency to register substantial global and bilateral 
trade surpluses pose a serious problem either for its trading partners or for 
the world trading system as a whole? 
Certainly a Japanese trade surplus of$ 80-100 billion only represents some 2-3% 
of total world trade ($ 3,500 b. plus). Equally, for both the EC and the US, 
trade flows with Japan tend to rate fairly low on any list of major export and 
import markets by size. In the EC's case, for example, two-way trade with the 
us, EFTA, the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the 
non-oil exporting developing countries are all more substantial than two-way 
trade with Japan. Japan is only the world's third largest exporting nation, 
after Germany and the United States. In 1990, the latter two countries exported 
$ 410 b. and $ 393 b. worth of products, respectively, compared with Japan's 
total of $ 288 b. France's exports totalled $ 216 b. and the UK's $ 185 b. in 
1990, with populations less than half that of Japan. Japanese per capita exports 
are not especially high, by OECD standards. 
What then is the particular nature of the Japan trade problem, and why does it 
prove so controversial and so intractable? 
The two fundamental (and unique) characteristics of Japan's trade performance 
are i) the extraordinary low import propensity of the economy in manufactured 
products, and ii) the disproportionate concentration of exports in a relatively 
narrow band of advanced manufactures, where they cause maximum disruption to the 
market share of producers from other advanced economies (most notably the US and 
the EC). 
Although Japan's global trade surpluses are very high- the persistently highest 
by far of any one trading nation - it is the particular profile of that trade, 
with its asymmetrical relationship to that of its trading partners, which makes 
Japanese trade surpluses so controversial and problematic. When two or three 
years ago, before unification, Germany briefly slipped ahead of Japan as the 
economy registering the world's largest trade surplus, there was little if any 
criticism of the Federal Republic. The difference with Japan was that Germany 
tended to both import and export a much broader range of goods than Japan: its 
surplus was both less visible and less disruptive. 
Trade figures show that Japan has long enjoyed a surplus with all economic 
regions and blocs of the world except the oil-exporting countries of the Middle 
East. (At the low point of the surplus in 1990, Japan also had a deficit with 
the former Comecon countries and Australia). By commodity, Japan has a trade 
surplus on all items except fuels, ra\'1 materials, chemical products and 
foodstuffs. Japan's principal exports_are overwhelmingly comprised of machinery 
and equipment of \-lhich: 25% transportation equipment, 23% electrical machinery, 
22% general machinery, 5% precision instruments, and 7% metal products. Japan's 
principal imports are correspondingly fuels (24%), foodstuffs (13%), chemicals 
(7%), textiles (6%), and various raw materials (13%). Machinery and equipment, 
which represent three quarters of Japan's exports, represent only some 17% of 
Japanese imports (compared with 6% in the early 1980's). The comparable figure 
for the US is 37%, for Germany 45%, for France 41%, and for the UK 42%. 
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The trade profile which results has long been, and continues to be, unbalanced 
to a striking degree. In many sectors, Japan actually exports less than the OECD 
average: in ceramics and glass, oil refining and oil products, chemical and 
rubber, paper and pulp, wood products, leather goods, textiles, food, tobacco, 
and non-ferrous metals. B~t perversely, Japan imports less than the OECD average 
in nearly all these areas as well. Conversely, Japan exports double the OECD 
average in machinery and equipment and metal products (such as steel), and in 
these fields imports relatively little. 
Japan's overall performance is one characterised by low imports (except on 
necessities), low exports in many relatively inefficient sectors, and extremely 
high exports in a specific range of super-competitive manufactured products. 
These latter products are most notably motor vehicles (15% of total Japanese 
exports), consumer electronics, office machinery, scientific and optical 
equipment, telecommunications equipment, and semiconductors and electronic 
parts. 
Japan accounts for 33% of total world exports of telecommunications equipment 
and less than 1% of imports. For Germany, the corresponding figures are 9% and 
6%. Japan accounts for 22% of total world exports of electrical machinery and 
only 3% of imports. For Germany, the corresponding figures are 19% and 10%. 
Japan accounts for 31% of world exports of passenger cars and less than 1% of 
imports. The corresponding figures for Germany are 25% and 7%. Statistics such 
as these show the dramatic imbalance in Japan's trading performance in certain 
advanced products and suggest the importance of exports to the nation's overall 
economic performance. 
As the Japanese economy has grown, the super-competitive industries have become 
ever stronger. For a long time, they have been a major engine for domestic 
economic growth. Unless the (necessarily limited) domestic market expands very 
rapidly (as it did in the period 1986-90) , the only substantial source of 
growing demand for these sectors lies abroad. The result is that in many of the 
areas where Japanese efficiency is renowned, half or more of the output is sent 
off-shore. In 1989, the proportion was over 75%, for example for typewriters, 
video cassette recorders, watches, cameras and photocopying machines. These 
percentages are likely to rise, not fall, as Japan's global trade surplus climbs 
again. 
Japan's towering strength in, and heavy reliance on, exports of manufactured 
products is reflected in trade figures on the manufactured account. In 1989, 
Japan enjoyed a manufactured trade surplus of $ 167.3 b. (compared with an 
overall trade surplus of$ 62.2 b.), derived from exports of$ 251.8 b. and 
imports of $ 84.5 b. (In 1986, for comparison, the respective figures were $ 
145.4 b. ($ 92.6 b.), $ 194.1 b. and$ 48.0 b). What these figures reveal is 
that Japan's manufactured trade surplus has declined during the high growth 
years, as a percentage of total two-way trade, from a spectacularly high figure 
of 43% to· 35%. 
In absolute terms, manufactured exports rose by 30% during the period 1986-89, 
but manufactured imports soared by 76%. As a result, the manufactured trade 
surplus edged up by only 15%. Any slackening of import growth - of the kind that 
began in 1991 - will quickly send this process into reverse, with a rising 
manufactured trade surplus constituting once again over 40% of Japan's two-way 
trade. 
- 21 - PE 155.246/fin. 
Despite the fact that external trade constitutes a smaller percentage of GDP in 
Japan than in either the EC or US, Japan has in fact become more dependent on 
that trade than any of its notionally more dependent trading partners. 
Compounding this problem is a consequent tendency in Japan to believe that, 
reliant on the import of raw materials and the export of manufactures, it 
cannot afford to import the same kind of high technology, industrial and 
consumer goods as it produces and exports, on any substantial scale. The 
comparison with Germany is instructive. Germany is one of the world's largest 
exporters and importers of motor cars and machine tools. In 1990, Japan exported 
(by value) nine times as many motor cars as it imported, and six times as many 
machine tools. Until Japan broadens its import base - whether or not its export 
performance slackens - it is difficult to imagine that "friction" with trading 
partners will be significantly relieved. 
Ill) Im>ORT RESISTANCE IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 
The difficulties to others posed by Japan's high degree of export dependency, 
especially in high-technology manufactures, are compounded by the continuing 
problems encountered by foreign producers in securing market access on any 
substantial scale in Japan. 
The import resistance of the Japanese economy is legendary. Japan's import 
propensity for manufactured goods, currently running at around 3% of GDP, is the 
lowest of any OECD economy. Its manufactured imports on a per capita basis -
that is in absolute value per person - have traditionally been the lowest of any 
OECD economy except Turkey. The Japanese Government and manufacturers would 
attribute this consumer reluctance to purchase foreign products to inferior 
quality, marketing or design. Many Western governments, including both US and 
EC trade negotiators, would attribute it, at least in part, to what one has 
called "systematic governmental and government-sanctioned private practices 
which severely restrict market access in Japan." 
There is little doubt that over the last two decades, the Japanese authorities 
have been engaged in a conscious policy of gradually dismantling a massive 
panoply of official import barriers built up during the post-war reconstruction 
and early manufacturing decades to 1970. The most tangible evidence of this has 
been the progressive removal of tariff and quota restrictions in most all 
advanced consumer products where they were used to allow a "breathing space" for 
product development. The few remaining tariffs and quotas that exist relate 
almost entirely to "traditional" sectors such as alcoholic beverages, leather 
and leather products, furs, textiles, wood, paper, glass, vegetables, fruits and 
processed agricultural products. In these sectors, where manufacturers are 
generally less efficient than competitors abroad, there are often pronounced 
political constraints on the governing LOP. Spectacular examples of formal 
import restrictions for domestic political reasons are the total ban on foreign 
rice in Japan and the 60% tariffs that apply to all but a small percentage of 
leather imports into Japan. 
As the importance of tariffs and quotas has dwindled, other governmental 
hindrances to trade have assumed growing importance in the eyes of Western 
critics, and have become the subject of substantial pressure for reform. These 
have included, most notably, the complex web of often discriminatory technical 
standards and certification procedures, which tended to be unaligned to 
international practice and less liberal than those prevailing in Japan's major 
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competitors. Sectors where such restrictions have been important include 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, cosmetics, medical equipment and household 
appliances. Recurrent problems for importers have been faced as a result of i) 
the self-certification and intra-industry standards - setting practices which 
operate within Japanese industry; ii) the frequency and technical detail 
required of the testing of imported products - which is time-consuming, costly 
and disadvantageous, in terms of the obligatory publication of sensitive product 
information by non-Japanese firms; and iii) the fastidious and often burdensome 
way in which the various import regulations are administered. 
The progressive internationalisation and liberalisation of Japanese technical 
standards and certification procedures, combined with the simplification of 
their application, has in turn focused attention on more structural market-based 
deterrents to imports, often only partially amenable to government control. Most 
prominent among these have been the following mutually reinforcing phenomena: 
the operation of Japan's highly complex and relatively inefficient 
distribution system; 
the interconnecting group structures of Japan's industrial and financial 
worlds, with self-contained and self-sustaining blocs of operators, most 
notably in the Keiretsu systems; 
the producer rather than consumer oriented assumptions which generate, and 
tolerate, weak competition policy, collusive pricing and formal and 
informal barriers to mergers and acquisitions within the Japanese market. 
With more shops per head of population than any other country in the world, and 
with the development of large stores restricted by law, the Japanese 
distribution system remains - to importer and domestic consumer alike - costly, 
complex, rigid and diffuse. It is characterised by multiple layers, exclusive 
distribution chains and hefty mark-ups. Closely supporting Japan's six million 
retailers are no less than four million wholesalers, the latter linked tightly 
to the former by a variety of mutual support arrangements. Wholesalers in turn 
are often firmly tied to major manufacturers, especially in a number of sectors 
of key concern to importers: the motor industry, consumer electronics, household 
appliances, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals and confectionery. Manufacturers prefer, 
wherever possible, to use vertically-integrated distribution channels to speed 
delivery and reduce overheads, converting wholesalers into often "captive" 
partners or buying them out completely. For a foreign producer to attempt to 
gain access to such a system is very difficult; to circumvent it is virtually 
impossible . 
. 
As the costs and practical logistics of setting up an independent distribution 
chain from scratch are almost prohibitive, newcomers to the Japanese market must 
fall back on existing channels. This can mean negotiating up to four layers of 
intermediaries before reaching even one retail outlet: foreign and domestic 
trading companies and both primary and secondary wholesale concerns. Of course, 
nearly all established trading companies and wholesalers already have Japanese 
clients manufacturing goods in direct competition with imports. Foreign 
companies have to promise immediate profits on a fairly major scale if they are 
to successfully displace or disrupt existing and often exclusive relationships 
built up over many years. So even if of a higher quality, foreign goods can 
rarely offer this prospect. 
An appreciation of these constraints is important in understanding why so many 
Western exporters have to limit themselves to products otherwise unavailable in 
Japan, and against which no domestic competition as such exists. Certain types 
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of specialised or precision, as opposed to mass production, technical equipment 
(notably in the medical sector) provide cases in point. More importantly, this 
situation explains how Western, especially European, luxury products have been 
able to penetrate the complexities of the distribution system. Pigeon-holed as 
minority-taste or niche items with a foreign "cachet", they constitute almost 
by definition little threat to established Japanese mass-produced competition, 
with high prices a key component of their appeal. This enables manufacturers, 
trading companies and retailers all to earn substantial profits, at the same 
time as the consumer enjoys a "positional" good. 
The distribution system outlined above dovetails with the dominance of the 
interconnecting group structures of Japan's industrial and financial worlds. 
Sometimes, these blocs are based on the classic model of the pre-war Zaibatsu -
or groups of banks, trading houses and a whole range of manufacturing concerns 
- which recombined as "economic families" under the title Keiretsu after the 
war. In other instances, they are based on new groups brought together in ad hoc 
configurations but still founded on principles of solidarity and self-reliance. 
Up to sixteen major groupings, accounting for one quarter of Japanese domestic 
sales, operate in this way. They build a substantial wall of "internal 
dependence" and "repetitive trading" by small and large firms alike against 
foreign competition, except on terms advantageous to the corporate interests of 
Japan. 
The interlocking features of the distribution system and the Keiretsu have been 
widely criticised by US and EC trade negotiators and subject to a limited degree 
of Japanese government reform. They featured very prominently in the 1989-90 
"Structural Impediments Initiative" (SSI) talks between the US and Japan. Three 
of the central conclusions of these negotiations were: 
the deregulation of the distribution system, with liberalisation of 
restrictions on large stores and of resale price maintenance obligations; 
the rendering "more open and transparent" of Keiretsu practices; 
the strengthening of competition policy provisions against exclusive 
business practices and improving of the transparency of 
government/business relations. 
The distance to be travelled in securing reforms of this character is still very 
great. Price competition is difficult to secure so long as "dumping" is 
unique among GATT countries - recognised as an internal as well as external 
market phenomenon. This means that predatory pricing between manufacturers is 
formally barred, one of the reasons why Japanese consumer products are often 
more expensive in Japan than in other East Asian markets. Collusive pricing is 
often sanctioned in areas exempted from competition policy such as 
transportation and financial services - and resale price maintenance remains in 
a variety of sectors, including for example the sale of records and compact 
discs. Where competition does apply, according to the OECD, illegal cartel 
arrangements are not subject to fines in most cases. Instead, implementation 
relies heavily on "administrative measures", the majority of 111hich are warnings 
without significant penalties. 
Mergers and acquisitions of existing firms, the quickest way to enter any 
market, have always been especially difficult in Japan. Japanese business 
practices, such as widespread mutual shareholdings within the Keiretsu and 
advance reporting of acquisition intentions to the authorities, have severely 
discouraged hostile bids. Major foreign investors find that "organic growth" 
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starting with a joint venture and than going solo - rather than acquisition is, 
unique among Western markets, the only practical means of securing a substantial 
base in Japan. 
Companies that eschew these established practices frequently find that various 
"attrition techniques" are deployed by Japanese competitors to undermine western 
entrants. One of the most problematic risks run by importers is counterfeiting 
in all its forms. Japan has long had very weak domestic legislation for 
guaranteeing intellectual property rights, whether to safeguard patents (for 
inventions), design registration (for product styling), trademarks and service 
marks (for product or company identification), copyrights (for authorship) or 
trade secrets (for confidential business and technical information). This leads 
to a lack of protection for both actual and potential importers, who risk having 
their product range appropriated by Japanese rivals. Luxury items, with 
distinctive labelling, design or "cachet", are especially vulnerable. Foreign 
firms often have to wait several years for the registration of patents and 
trademarks, and then they have to publish detailed technical specifications, 
which renders their designs vulnerable in the meantime to copying by competing 
producers. Few legal sanctions exist against false claims of national origin or 
the pre-emptive registration of foreign trademarks by Japanese firms. 
A growing number of Western products have in recent years managed to overcome 
the cumulative barriers posed successively by remaining tariffs and quotas, 
customs regulations, certification and testing procedures, the distribution 
system, the practice of reciprocal purchasing within a group-dominated private 
sector, difficulties in undertaking mergers and acquisitions and inadequate 
protection of intellectual property rights. Progress has been made in respect 
of many of these areas. However, all foreign trade negotiators and in many cases 
the Japanese Government itself - agree that further concerted efforts are 
necessary. Until it is undertaken, there is little practical prospect that 
Japan's exceptionally low propensity to import manufactured products will rise 
to anything approaching that of its major OECD trading partners. 
IV) THE GR~ OF A JAPANESE INVESTMENT IMBALANCE 
Whilst Japan's global trade and current account surpluses fell during the period 
1986-89 - with the Japan/EC surpluses remaining broadly constant - a dramatic 
expansion occurred in Japanese investment in third countries, especially in the 
European Community. 
Between 1985 and 1990, Japan's stock of direct investment abroad rose from $ 
83. 6b. to $ 31 0. 5 b. , an increase of some 3 7 0%. Europe proved to be a 
particularly favoured destination for such investment. Inward flows amounted to 
some $ 14.3 b. in 1990 alone, producing a cumulative total of $ 59 b. by March 
1991. The EC share of total Japanese overseas investment rose from an average 
of 15% in the period before 1987, to 19% in 1988, 22% in 1989 and 25% in 1990. 
The United States continues to have by far the largest stock of cumulative 
Japanese inward investment. Its total is some$ 130 b., and has consistently 
been approximately double that of the EC. The growing EC share has been 
primarily at the expense of Japan's Asian neighbours. In 1990, the total 
Japanese investment stock was higher in the EC than in Asia for the first time. 
Early figures for 1991 suggest that this gap is continuing to widen. Asia was 
the first region to receive inward investments from Japan when the latter began 
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to internationalise production. As that process has continued, the EC has 
become, after the US, the next main target. 
Today, Japan's total overseas production remains low by international standards, 
equivalent to only 8% of domestic production. The comparable figure both for the 
major EC economies and for the US is around 20%. Of Japan's direct foreign 
investments, only about a quarter are in fact in manufacturing (mainly 
electrical equipment). The larger non-manufacturing component is concentrated 
in banking/insurance, general services and property, in that order. 
The main targets of Japan's growing investments in the EC have been the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, which have 38% and 22% of the total respectively. 
Luxembourg boasts 9%, Germany 8% and France 7%. The main advantages enjoyed by 
the UK and Netherlands appear to lie in the prevalence of the English language 
and the relatively simple tax structures of these countries. 
The growth of large-scale Japanese investment abroad has not been matched by EC 
or US investment in Japan on any comparable scale. Total foreign investment in 
Japan reached a cumulative level of $ 18.4 b. in 1990, equivalent to only one 
seventeenth of Japan's investments abroad. A majority of these assets have been 
built up since the mid 1980's, with 48% held by North American investors and 27% 
by European investors (notably German, Dutch and Swiss). However, US investment 
has been falling in recent years, in both absolute and relative terms, and is 
now less than $ 1 b. per year. The corresponding EC figure has been rising, 
although somewhat erratically, and is now some$ 1.4 b. (out of an annual total 
of$ 2.8 b. in 1989 and 1990). 
Foreign investment is concentrated in manufacturing (65%), with Japan viewed as 
a simple production base rather than a broadly-based platform for a range of 
corporate activities. Half of all foreign manufacturing investment is in 
specialist precision machine tool equipment (which Japanese manufacturers have 
tended to eschew in favour of mass production models), and a third is in 
chemicals (where the domestic sector is unusually weak). As a result, foreign 
investment in Japan does not follow the normal pattern of broadly-based inward 
investment among industrialised economies. Instead, it suggests an asymmetrical 
relationship in investment flows between Japan and both the EC and the US, not 
dissimilar to the obvious asymmetry which exists in respect of trade flows. 
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ANNEX 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
by Mr ROBLES PIQUER 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
83-2284/90 
on the creation of a framework for economic cooperation between Japan 
and the European Community 
Jhe_Juropean Parliament, 
A. having regard to the significant levels of economic development achieved 
by both Japan and the European Community and the influence of both 
throughout the world, 
B. whereas it is essential that both economies should assume the role of 
solidarity required of them from all quarters, whether from the Third 
World or from the countries which are now recovering their freedom, 
C. whereas economic cooperation between Japan and the European Community on 
an organized and rational basis would be of indisputable benefit to all 
of humanity, 
D. whereas it would therefore be desirable to create a framework for 
economic cooperation between the two societies, within whi eh economic 
activity would be carried out both for their own benefit and for that of 
the countries which require their cooperation and solidarity, 
1. Calls for the creation of an overall framework for economic cooperation 
between Japan and the European Community; 
2. Calls for this framework to encourage both productive mutual cooperation 
and the consolidation on the basis of solidarity of development aid to 
third countries in need; 
3. Recommends that such a framework should be based on a treaty of economic 
cooperation . 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
by Mrs MUSCARDINI 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
on steel imports from Japan 
The European Parliament, 
83-0146/91 
A. whereas Japan will this year be suspending its system of voluntary 
restraints on steel exports to the EC, which has been in operation since 
1985, 
B. whereas market prices for steel are higher in Japan than in Europe, 
C. whereas Japanese steel exports to the EEC rose in 1990 to 411 000 tonnes 
an increase of 44.7% compared to 1989, 
1. Calls on the Commission to draw up a plan for subsidies to overcome the 
crisis in the European iron and steel industry; 
2. Calls for measures to ensure that Community imports from Japan do not in 
practice exceed the quotas fixed in the trade agreements between the EEC 
and Japan. 
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B3-0202/91 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
by Mr . CARVALHO CARDOSO and others 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rule_s of Proc~ure . 
on vulnerability to Japan in the electron1cs f1eld 
-
The European Parliament, 
A. whereas a report published in the Japanese English-language newspaper 
Mainichi Daily News on 29 January 1991 states that the United States 
would be unable to maintain its current war effort without the help of 
Japanese industry, 
B. whereas this 
Rikuo Sato, 
imports. from 
report, signed by the newspaper's Washington correspondent 
points out that the United States depends entirely on 
Japan in seven areas, including ceramics, microchips, diodes 
and transistors, 
c. whereas, according to a paper by the American Electronics Association, 
thirteen components of American weaponry are now imported from Japan, 
~D. whereas these•reports confirm the accuracy of the celebrated statement in 
Shintiro Ishihara's book, The Japan that can say no, that if Japan 
refuoed to sell Washington any more microchips, the Pentagon would be 
totally defenceless although this could lead to renewed military 
occupation of Japan by the United States, 
E. whereas the situation in the European Community would appear to be much 
worse than that in the United States, 
~ 
1. Calls on the Commission to assess seriously the risks that this situation 
poses for the Community, in time of peace and in time of war; 
2. Asks the Commission to submit a report on this subject as a matter of 
urgency • 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
by Hrs MUSCARDINI 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
B3-0257/91 
on the negotiations between the European Community and Japan to liberalize trade 
in leather and leather goods 
-
The European Parliament, 
A. having regard to the 6~4 increase registered over the last five years in 
the amount of leather and leather goods being sold in Japan, due partly 
to imports from outside Japan and partly to greater penetration of the 
market by Japanese leather manufacturers, 
~- whereas the basic duty, at the rate of 60%, levied by Japan on imported 
leather goods was discussed at the negotiations between the European 
Community and Japan. \llhere it was agreed that the rate would be reduced 
to 40%,. although this rate is still considered to be too high by the 
European leather industry, 
C. noting that this reduction in the protective duty from 60% to 40% and the 
15% increase in the current absurdly low import quotas have the effect of 
heavily penali 7 ing the European leather industry. which employs 70 000 
• people and has an annual turnover of ECU 10 billion, 
1. Calls for measures to abolish the inflexible regulations governing 
imports of leather into Japan; 
2. Ca 11 s on the Community to 1 aunch a progranune to permit the European 
leather industry to gain access to the Japanese market and to replace the 
system of ta~iffs and quotas that so heavily penalizes exports from the 
European Conununity; 
3. Calls for the introduction of a directive containing measures to aid the 
European leather industry, currently faced with the additional problem 
that leather exports from Third Countries account for 25% of the total 
market. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
by I-Zrs I-mSCARDINI 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the EEC-Japan agreetilent on tanned hides 
The European Parliament, 
BJ-1919/91 
-
A. whereas, in the next few days, the Community will enter into negotiations 
on the renewal of the three-year agreement with Japan on trade in tanned 
hides, 
B. whereas the present quotas proposed by the Japanese authori t 1 es as a 
basis for negotiations are equivalent to 1-~ of production and to some 
two days' worth of processing in Europe, 
C. whereas Japanese tanners are the largest purchasers of American, 
Australian and New Zealand raw hides, 
Calls for: 
1. decisive action by the Community to thwart the Japanese proposals; 
2. a Community di'rective regulating imports of tanned hides and setting a 
ceiling for purchases of European raw hides, to be taken therefore from 
-:upplie;; available in lhe Community and subject to a speculative rise, by 
.Japanese lanners. 
- 31 - PE 155.246/fin./Ann. 
/ 
DA 
'· 
B3-0065/92 
• 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
by Mrs MUSCARDINI 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
on the EEC-Japan negotiations on tanned hides 
... 
' 
The European Parliament, 
A. whereas, during the GATT negotiations on tanned hides, the Community has 
decided to accept the Japanese offers on the three-yearly renewal of the 
bilateral agreement, 
B. whereas the quotas proposed by the Japanese penalise the Community 
industry, and in particular the Italian industry, the largest in the 
sector, which accounts for 50% of production, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
DE 
Calls for a Community directive imposing reciprocity on countries which 
practise protectionism on raw or semi-processed hides, or against 
countries which obstruct Community exports of tanned hides; 
.... "'\, 
Calls for a Community directive controlling European stock to guarante ~ 
an ·~dequate supply to the tanning industry; 
Calls for a directive to guarantee the protection of consumers against 
fraud and imitation hides via the establishment of a seal of quality; 
Calls for a directive promoting the 'made in Europe' concept, to help the 
tanning tndustry and indirectly to assist European products. 
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